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1． lntroduction
   The latter half of the eighth century B．C．E． in the Near East was a period of Assyrian resurgence and
expansion to the west under the powerfu1 king， Tiglath-Pileser III． ln response to this threat， Rezin， king
of Aram， and Pekah， king of lsrael， formed an anti-Assyrian coalition and attempted to persuade Ahaz of
Judah to participate． After the Ahaz‘ rej ection of this offer， Rezin and Pekah advanced against Judah and
besieged Jerusalem， but had to withdraw because of the advancing Assyrian army， which took advantage
of the oppo血nity to crash the coalition． Thi串， so-called Syro-Ephraimite War， cannot be fUlly understood
without consideration of its background， some of its problems， and its consequences．
2． Background of the Syro-Ephraimite War
2．1． Assyrian expansion to the west
   In 738 B．C．E．， Tiglath-Pileser III received the tributes of Rezin of Damascus， Menahem of Samaria
and other western rulers （ANET：283）． ln 734 B．C．E．， the king campaigned against Philistia． His troops
reached “the city of the River of Egypt，” and erectgd a stela marking the southern boundary of the Assyrian
empire （Wiseman 1951：23）． As ANET （282，284） indicates， it was perhaps at this time that ldibilu， an
Arabic tribe， was installed as a Warden of Marches on the border of Egypt． The king of Gaza， Hanno， fled
to Egypt before the Assyrians besieged the city， but later was allowed to return to his office （ANET：283）．
Gaza became an Assyrian port to serve Assyria's commercial interest （Otzen 1979：255）． The years 733-
732 B．C．E． mark the successfu1 campaign against Damascus．
1） 1 would like to express my gratitude to Dr． Steven Olson for reviewing this article and suggesting
 necessary corrections for improvement．
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   With the expansion of its empire， Assyria dealt with its subj ects in a particular way． The subj ects can
be divided into．three types：，sqtellige or puppet．state， vassal state，，and province2．A satellite or puppet state
was the result of voluntary submission to Assyria by local rulers． The social， religious， and politidal life
of such a state suffered little interference as long as the state was submissive． When such state became dis-
loyal to Assyria， it was conquered by force， and turned into a vassal state， which was to pay regular tribute
and accept a significant Assyrian role in the state's life． lf a vassal state rebelled and was defeated， its ter-
ritory was incorporated into the Assyrian provincial system． lsrael experienced these stages in a short pe-
riod： voluntary submission in 738 B．C．E．， reduction to a vassal in 732 B．C．E．， and incorporation into an
Assyrian province （722-720 B．C．E．） after the fall of Samaria by Sargon II （Miller ＆ Hayes 1986：320-
321）．
2．2． Syrian expansion
      Rezin， whose hometown was Hadara rather than Damascus （ANET 283）， was probably an usurper
（Miller ＆ Hayes 1986：323）． This ambitious Syrian king was extensively involved in lsraelite and Judean
affairs． II Kings 15：37 indicates Rezin and Pekah threatening Judah during the reign of Jotham （？一742 B．
C．E．）． Since Pekah‘s reign over lsrae'1 was 735-732 B．' C．E．， this verse could be anachronistic． However，
the suggestion that Pekah was already ruling as a puppet． ruler of Rezin at that time over some portion of
Israel， the northern Transj ordan or Galilee （Miller ＆ Hayes 1986：324） is a reasonable interpretation． The
reason is that II Kings 15：37 did not mention Pekah during the reign of Jotham as a king of lsrael but
“Rezin king of Aram and Pekah son of Remaliah”， while II Kings 16：5 in the reign of Ahaz （742-727 B．
C， E．） states， “Rezin king of Aram and Pekah son of Remaliah king of Israel．” This explains why II Kings
15：27 assigns twenty years of reign for Pekah who ruled between Pekahiah （736-735） and Hoshea （732-
723） （Miller ＆ Hayes 1986：323）．
      As Ben Hadad II and Ahab fought against Shalmaneser III in 853 B．C．E．， Rezin attempted to form
an anti-Assyrian coalition of Syro-Palestinian states （c£ Galil 1992：60）． Mentioning Rezin in terms of re-
covering Elath （II Kings 16：6） indicates that Edomites associated with Rezin． Other Transjordanians
probably supported this takeover because of the geographical location of Aram in far north and Elath in
the soUth． A Philistine-Aram coalition is suggested by Isaiah 9：11-12 and II Chronicles 28：16-18， which
reported the raid of the Philistines against Judah while Ahaz sought assistance from Assyria （cf． Ehrlich
1991：58）． Samsi， queen of Arabia seems to have joined the coalition （ANET：284）． A text from Nimrud
2） The terminology is somewhat versatile among scholars： Otzen （1979：253） states the types一 as vassal
  state， PupPet state， and province． ln this paper， we follow Miller ＆ Hayes （1986）．
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（ND 4301，430i） states the alliance of Tyre with Rezin （Wiseman 1956：121）．
3． The Syro-Ephraimite War
3．1． The Date
      While the end of the Syro-Ephraimite War is clearly dated by the siege and the fall of Damascus
in 733-732 B．C．E．， the beginning is obscure． lt cannot be earlier than 735 B．C．E．， the accession of Pekah
to the throne of Samaria， since II Kings 16：5 refers to Pekah as a king of lsrael in besieging Jerusalem， nor
can it be later than the Assyrian attack of Damascus in 733-732 B． C．E． （II Kings 16：8-9）． The campaign
of Tiglath-Pileser III against Philistia in 734 B．C．E． occurred between these events． The question is
whether the Syro-Ephraimite War took place before or after the Philistine campaign．
      The period in question must accommodate the following events： （1）the formation of the anti-
Assyrian coalition between Rezin and Pekah and their contacts with Judah， （2）the advance of the coalition
forces and siege of Jerusalem （the war in our concern）， and （3）the-advance of the Assyrian forces
（Donner 1977：429）． The period between Pekah‘s enthronement in 735-B．C．E． and the Assyrian campaign
against一 Philistia in 734 B．C．E． appears to be too short to accommodate the three stages （Begrich
1929：215-216）． Thus， the Syro-Ephraimite War could not occur before the Philistine campaign of 734 B．
C． E．
      It is almost impossible for the coalition military action to coincide with the Assyrian campaign in
Philistia． Such military operation next to． the Assyrian presence would attract and challenge the Assyrians，
resulting in political and military catastrophe． lt was after the departure of the Assyrians from the Philistine
coast that the advance Of the coalition force could take place， （Donner 1977：430）． Hence， the Syro-
Ephraimite War occurred between 734 and 733 B．C．E． This will leave enough time for stage （1）， before
and during the Philistine campaign of Assyria．
     ・Our proposed date for the Syro-Ephraimite War also provides sufficient time for events described
in lsaiah： Ahaz'fear of the alliance between Aram and Ephraim （lsaiah 7：2）3 and the coalition's decision
to depose Ahaz militarily： “Let us go up against Judah and make her afraid．．． and let us enthrone son of
Tabeel” （lsaiah 7：6）． lt was probably at this time that the Aramean units advanced to lsrael to form the
coalition fbrce against Judah（Do皿er l 977：429）． Yahweh， then， assured that the plot of the two kings
would not happen （lsaiah 7：7） by giving Ahaz the sign of a new born child： ”Before the boy knows t6 re一
3） Considering the fact that old Judeo-lsraelite alliance was by its ' 魔?窒?nature anti-Aramean， as Oded
  （1972：159） indicates， it is understandable that the coalition of Rezin and Pekah caused “the hearts of
  Ahaz and his people to be shaken．”
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ject the evil and to choose the good， the land of the two kings you fear will be desolate” （7：16）． Finally，
Yahweh was said to use Assyria as his instrument to fulfi11 the defeat of Damascus and Samaria （8：5-
7；10：6）．
3．2． The Purpose
      We have dealt with Assyrian and Syrian expansion as the background of the Syro-Ephraimite War．
The purpose of the War， in general， was probably to fbrce Judah to j oin the anti-Assyrian coalition by re-
placing Ahaz with a figure who woUld support the coalition． II Chronicles 28：7 is particularly interesting
in our discussion： “Zicr， a wanior of Ephraim， killed Maaseiah son of the king （Ahaz）， Azrikam officer
of the palace and Elkanah second to the king．” Because it is unlikely that all three were at a battle field
at the same time， they must have undergone unusual death， assassination． This verse seems to suggest an
unsuccessfu1 assassination plot to exterminate the Davidic dynasty （Miller ＆ Hayes 1986：329）． Failure to
assassinate Ahaz perhaps caused the coalition to achieve its aim through military operation．
      The replacement candidate for Ahaz was “the son of Tabeel” （lsaiah 7：6）． One suggestion for
Tabeel is Tubail， king of Tyre， the major Phoenician city （Vanel 1974：23）． Another suggestion is that
Tabeel was connected with the family of Tobiads who caused difficulty for the returnees from Babylon
during the post-exilic period （Oded 1972：163）． ln either case， the son of Tabeel， if ascended to the throne
of Judah， would have j oined， supported and contributed to the anti-Assyrian coalition．
      Ahaz'refusal to follow the lsraelite anti-Assyrian policy may have been perceived by Pekah as re-
bell」ous conduct （lsaiah 8：11-15）． This is supported by the fact that Judah， fr6m an lsraelite perspective，
always had functioned as a vassal （Miller ＆ Hayes 1986：329）． For instance， 1 Kings 22：3-4 relates the war
to retake Ramoth Gilead， and although this was a purely Aram；Israel matter， Jehoshaphat agreed to
Ahab's request to fight together against Aram． Jehoshaphat also gave an affirmative reply to the appeal of
Jehoram， king of lsrael： “The king of Moab rebelled against me； will you go with me to fight against
Moab？” （II Kings 3：7）． Hence， removal of Ahaz from his throne could have been punishment to a rene一'
gade vassal （Miller ＆ Hayes 1986：329）．
      There are two objections against our view of the aim of the Syro-Ephraimite War． First， Oded
（1972：153） states that if the aim of the coalition was to form an anti-Assyrian league， it is not clear why
they should attack Jerusalem and weaken themselves while exposing the northern flank against Assyria．
However， there is evidence that the fbrces of Rezin and Pekah could advance against Judah vi1加ally un-
molested： the anti-Assyrian sentiment was prevalent among Judeans， who “rej oice over Rezin and the son
of Remaliah” （lsaiah 8：6）． Moreover， the northern flank was not exposed because both Syria and lsrael
had paid tribute in 738 B．C．E． to Assyria， which would not attack her satellite states without a sign of
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rebellion． Second， Oded （1972：153） insists that the wars between states in Syria-Palestine were caused not
by attempts to organize a coalition but by disputes over territorieS and struggles for power （cf． Tomes
1993：70）． lt is advisable， however， to remember that there is no governing law of human behavior； the ac-
tion of the coalition should not be evaluated by an unfounded notion that every war in Syria-Palestine has
to be related with tenitorial disputes． We suggest that the failed attempt to assassinate Ahaz might have
led to the military action to achieve dethronement of Ahaz and to enthrone the son of Tabeel who would
join the Anti-Assyrian coalition．
3．3． Ahaz and his “bribe” ，
      “Ahaz sent messengers to Tiglath-Pileser， ‘1 am your servant and your son． Come up and rescue me
from the hand of the king of Aram and of the king of Israel， who are attacking me'．．． and he sent a bribe
to the king of Assyria” （II Kings 16：7-8）． As mentioned earlier， since the attack of Jerusalem must have
taken place between the Assyrian campaign of Philistia in 734 B．C．E．， and the campaign against
Damascus in 733-2 B．C．E．， the bribe had to be sent between these events． lt has been suggested that
Ahaz' 垂≠凾高?獅?was simply a response to the ' `ssyrian presence in the area rather than vice versa （Miller
＆ Hayes 1986：345）； namely， the gift was not a bribe but a voluntary tribute． There are several reasons for
this opinion．
      First， there is no previous record that Ahaz had submitted to Assyria and had been considered a sat-
ellite state． Because the Assyrians were not international mercenaries， it is unlikely that they would have
rescued a non-subj ect state． Secondly， during the crisis， Judah was surrounded by hostile states under an
anti-Assyrian movement； therefore， sending an embassy carrying a “bribe” to the Assyrians would proba-
bly been intercepted by those states． Thirdly， while the campaign against Philistia in 734 B．C．E． remains
unmentioned in the Bible， the Assyrian attack of Damascus in 733-732 B．C．E． is associated with Ahaz‘
payment （II Kings 16：9）． Fourthly， both ANET 282 and II Chronicles 28：20-21 mention no indication of
special contribution by Ahaz； the “bribe” is treated as an ordinary tribute．・Finally， lsaiah 7：1-8：15 states
nothing about a special appeal made by Ahaz （Miller ＆ Hayes 1986：342-345）．
      It seems that the word s！h！g11nagouhad， bribe， was used to express criticism against Ahaz． To the Biblical
writer， Ahaz was the sinfu1 king who did not trust God and made Judah a subj ect of Assyria． That is why
II Kings 16：7 used the expression “ 凾盾浮?servant and your son” which official annals would not have used
（Miller ＆ Hayes 1986：345）． Hence， as Tadmor ＆ Cogan （1979：506） indicates， the “bribe” of Ahaz was
constmcted by the Biblical writer who intended to make Ahaz a king “walking in the ways of the kings
of lsrael” （II Kings 16：3）．
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4． Consequences of the Syro-Ephraimite War
4．1． General Results
      The advance of the Assyrian army caused the allied forces to withdraw from Jerusalem． Then，
Tiglath-Pileser III proceeded to attack Damascus and captured it． Rezin was killed （II Kings 16：9）． New
Assyrian provinces were established at the former Syrian tenitory and regions once influenced by Aram：
Syria， Karnaim， Megiddo， Hauran， and Gilead． lsrael had controlled many of these regions， but they were
taken as Aram expanded its tenitory． This will explain why II Kings 15：29 states the Assyrian incorpora-
tion of these areas without claiming that Assyria took them from lsrael： “ln the time of Pekah king of
Israel， Tiglath-Pileser king of Assyria came and took ljon， Abel-beth-maacah， Janoah， Kedesh， Hazor，
Gilead， and Galilee， all the land of Naphtali and he brought the people to Assyria” （Miller ＆ Hayes
1986：332）．
      In lsrael， it appeats that the pro-Assyrian party gained the upper hand．． Pekah was assassinated by
Hoshea （II Kings 15：30）， and Tiglath-Pileser III recognized Hoshea as a new king： “They （lsraelites）
overthrew their king Pekah and 1 placed Hoshea as king over them” （ANET：284）． The territory of lsrael
is now rightly referred to as the small state of Ephraim： “wnen Ephraim saw his sickness．．．then Ephraim
turned to Assyria．．．But he is not able to cure you．．．For 1 will be like a lion to Ephraim．．．1 will tear them
to pieces and go away．．．” （Hosea 5：13-14）．
      Assyria gained the control of Transj ordanian kingdoms． ANET （282，284） mentions that Sanipu of
Ammon， Salamanu of Moab， Kaushmalaku of Edom and Samsi queen of Arabia paid tributes to Tiglath-
Pileser III． Judah also became a satellite state of Assyria （Miller ＆ Hayes 1986：332）．
4．2． Ahaz'New Altar
      After Tiglath-Pileser III conquered Damascus， Ahaz visited Damascus to greet the Assyrian king．
Ahaz saw an altar there，・and sent the design back to Jerusalem． Following the plans， the priest Uriah had
an altar built before the king returned． The new altar replaced the former bronze altar， which was set aside
for the king‘s private inquiry （II Kings 16：10-18）． There are two possibilities about the nature of this new
altar： it was modeled after an Assyrian altar or a Syrian altar．
      The first opinion suggests that the Assyrians had installed their altar in Damascus when they cap-
tured the city and that Ahaz voluntarily adopted the altar as a form of submission or even was compelled
to do so （Soggin 1985：228）． Since the Ar，qmeans （and their gods） had been defeated， copying an Aramean
altar at that time would have been odd． Noth （1960：266） also indicates that the removal of the royal
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entryway outside the temple was done “because of the king of Assyria” （II Kings 16：18）； thereby， royal
authority over the sanctuary was lost．
      However， the altar Ahaz imitated was likely to be a Syrian altar． II Chronicles 28：22-23 indicates
that Ahaz' obsession with the Syrian cult probably had originated before the Syro-Ephraimite War， when
Damascus was dominant． Though the Syrian ' №盾р?must have become less appea．ling after the defeat of
Damascus， the design of the Syrian altar still seems to have appealed to Ahaz． The passage ”because of the
king of Assyria” （II Kings 16：18） should be interpreted as the purpose of making tribute to Assyria rather
than accommodating Assyrian religion （Miller ＆ Hayes 1986：346）． ln addition， because Judah was a sat-
ellite state， which was free from religious obligations， Ahaz by no means needed to accept Assyrian relig-
ion， and Judah succeeded in retaining this nominal independence until the end of Assyrian empire （Cogan
1974：60-65）．
      There are some reasons that the new altar of Ahaz seems to have served a legitimate Yahwistic cult．
First， the priest Uriah did not protest the introduction of the altar into the Temple． Since Uriah was fully
Yahwist as lsaiah 8：2 described him to be a “faithfu1 witness，” the Syrian cult practice would have met his
strong protest （Snaith ＆ Calkins 1954：275）． Secondly， various sacrifices mentioned in II Kings 16：10-15
in association with the new altar were typical lists of sacrificial cult， apd can hardly be a ，source for Syrian
cult practices （Greenfield 1987：70）． Thirdly， subsequent history of the new altar supports the use for
Yahwistic cult． As Cogan （1974：75） indicates， Ahaz' altar survived the religious reform of Hezekiah and
Josiah； Ezekiel 9：2 reports the old bronze altar during the last days of Jerusalem by the Temple's northern
gate， where Ahaz had placed it to make space for his new altar．
5． Conclusion
      The Assyrian expansion to the west and Syrian expansion lie behind the Syro-Ephraimite War．
Starting丘oln 738 B．C．E．，the Assyrian empire gradually reduced westem kingdoms through three stages：
sat，ellite， vassal， and province． The ambitious Syrian king Rezin， on the other hand， seems to have formed
an anti-Assyrian coalition with Israel， Edom， Phili＄tia， Arabia， and Tyre， with an attempt to also include
Judah．
      The date of the Syro-Ephraimite War probably falls between 734 B． C．E．， when the Assyrians cam-
paigned against Philistia and 733 B．C．E．， when they besieged and captured Damascus． This will accom-
modate three stages of events（see chart）and the inforrnation丘om Isaiah． A failed attempt to assassinate
Ahaz and Ahaz' refusal to follow the lsraelite policy probably caused the coalition to launch war against
Judah in order to depose Ahaz and replace him with the son of Tabeel， who would j oin the anti-Assyrian
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coalition．
      Though II Kings 16：7-8 claims that Ahaz sent a bribe to Tiglath-Pileser III to ask fbr rescue丘om
Rezin and Pekah， the gift was possibly a voluntary tribute instead of a bribe， which might have been con-
structed by the writer to portray Ahaz as unfaithfu1 to God． The Syro-Ephraimite War ended with the ad-
vance of the Assyrian army， followed by the fall of Damascus． Rezin was killed， and Pekah was
assassinated by Hoshea． After visiting Tiglath-Pileser III at Damascus， Abaz set up a new altar following
a Syrian altar， and his new altar seems to have served a Yahwistic cult until the end of Judah．
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